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Abstract 
This paper summarizes several iterations in developing a compact set of four key principles for successful 
systems engineering, which are 1) Stakeholder Value-Based System Definition and Evolution 2) 
Incremental Commitment and Accountability 3) Concurrent Multidiscipline System Definition and 
Development, and 4) Evidence-Based and Risk-based Decisionmaking. It provides a rationale for the 
principles, including short example case studies of failed projects that did not apply the principles, and of 
successful projects that did. It will compare the principles with other sets of principles such as the Lean 
Systems Engineering and the Hitchins set of principles for successful systems and systems engineering.  
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1. Introduction 
Systems engineering and development processes and principles were initially created around 55 to 40 
years ago. At that time their users could generally assume the system would operate as a standalone 
device, its requirements could be specified up front, its behavior would seldom change, it could be 
designed top-down, and starting from a clean blackboard or sheet of paper. Given current trends in system 
development, these assumptions are becoming less valid.  Unfortunately, despite seminal broadening 
contributions from thought leaders such as [4],[7],[10], the original processes and principles have been 
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slow to change.  The Incremental Commitment Spiral Model (ICSM) is a life cycle process model 
generator that has been evaluated to be a flexible but robust framework for system development. The 
ICSM combines the strengths of various current process models and limits their weaknesses. The ICSM, 
like the Vee model, emphasizes early verification and validation, but allows for multiple-incremental 
interpretation and emphasizes concurrent rather than sequential engineering. Compared to the Spiral 
Model, the ICSM also focuses on risk-driven activity prioritization, but offers an improvement by adding 
well-defined in-process milestones. While ICSM, Rational Unified Process (RUP), and MBASE perform 
concurrent engineering that stabilizes the software process at anchor point milestones, ICSM also supports 
integrated hardware-software-human factors oriented development. Comparing with Agile methods, 
ICSM embraces adaptability to unexpected change and at the same time allows scalability.  
The following are the four key trends that require changes and how the ICSM suggests process changes 
for developing successful systems:  
 Increasingly complex, global systems of systems:  The Internet and personal communication devices 
are connecting most everything and everyone together.  Developers of 21st century systems will need to 
consider how they fit, not only within their own enterprise, but often within multiple networks of 
independently evolving, codependent systems.  The ICSM commitment milestones require evidence 
that the system be scalable to operate with its intended full-up environment, and be interoperable with 
its codependent systems for global collaborative processes.  
 Emergent requirements: Asking people what they would like in their user interface usually results in 
a response such as “I’m not sure, but I’ll know it when I see it” (IKIWISI).  The most appropriate user 
interfaces and collaboration modes for a complex human-intensive system are not specifiable in 
advance, but emerge with usage. Forcing users to specify them precisely in advance of development 
generally leads to poor business or mission performance and expensive late rework and delays.  The 
ICSM provides support for incremental and concurrent definition of system requirements and 
solutions, including competitive prototyping approaches. 
 Rapid change: Trying to stay competitive in a world of increasingly rapid changes requires new levels 
of agility, and shorter times between new releases of products and services. The ICSM’s incremental 
definition and development stages directly support shorter increments, more agile methods, and 
evolutionary development. 
 High assurance of qualities: At the same time that systems engineering and development need to 
become more agile, the growing interdependence of systems and people requires systems to have 
higher assurance levels. Just assuring any of the quality attributes for a complex system of systems is 
difficult.  It is even harder to get agreement among multiple system owners with widely disparate 
quality priorities. “Satisficing” means not everybody gets everything they want, but everybody gets 
something they are satisfied with. The ICSM’s principles of stakeholder satisficing and evidence-based 
commitment milestones help ensure that key stakeholders’ primary quality concerns are addressed. 
 
2. Key Principles 
To understand and apply the process model appropriately, the process users should understand the core 
concepts of the model. The followings are the key principles of the ICSM and example case studies. 
 
Principle 1: Stakeholder Value-Based System Definition and Evolution. The INCOSE definition of 
systems engineering is “An interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the realization of successful 
systems”. A system will be successful if and only if it makes winners of its success-critical stakeholders.  
Thus, in order to create a successful system, you need to identify which stakeholders are success-critical, 
to determine their value propositions or win conditions, and to define, design, develop, and evolve a 
mutually satisfactory or win-win system with respect to their value propositions.  If a project fails to 
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include and address the value propositions of its success-critical stakeholders such as end-users, 
maintainers, interoperators, or suppliers, these stakeholders will frequently feel little commitment (or 
active hostility) to the project and either underperform, decline to use, or block the use of the results. 
 
Principle 2: Incremental Commitment and Accountability. Without key personnel commitment and 
accountability for the system under development, there is no way to build trust among the system’s 
stakeholders.  It is too easy to overpromise and depart.  And there must be clear visibility of progress 
versus plans up and down the supplier chain. If success-critical stakeholders are not accountable for their 
commitments, they may not provide necessary commitments or decisions in a timely manner and are 
likely to be drawn away to other pursuits when they are most needed.  
 
Principle 3: Concurrent Multidiscipline System Definition and Development. The fundamental 
assumptions underlying sequential processes, prespecified requirements, and functional-hierarchy product 
models began to be seriously undermined in the 1970s and 1980s.  The increasing pace of change in 
technology, competition, organizations, and life in general has made assumptions about stable, 
prespecifiable requirements unrealistic.  The existence of cost-effective, competitive, incompatible 
commercial products or other reusable non-developmental items (NDIs) made it necessary to evaluate and 
often commit to solution components before finalizing the requirements. The difficulty of adapting to 
rapid change with brittle, optimized, point-solution architectures generally made optimized first-article 
design to fixed requirements unrealistic. The ICSM emphasizes the principle of concurrent rather than 
sequential work on understanding needs, envisioning opportunities, system scoping, system objectives 
and requirements determination, architecting and designing of the system and its hardware, software, and 
human elements, life cycle planning, and development of feasibility evidence. So, it is important to do 
everything in parallel, especially in the early phases.  If definition and development of requirements and 
solutions; hardware, software, and human factors; or product and process definition are done sequentially, 
the project is likely both to go more slowly, and to make early, hard-to-undo commitments that 
accumulate technical debt and cut off the best options for project success.   
 
Principle 4: Evidence-Based and Risk-based Decision making. Having evidence serves as the principal 
decision criterion at milestone decision reviews is a considerable step forward from traditional schedule-
based or event-based reviews.  This is better, but frequently leads to “Death by PowerPoint and SysML” 
reviews, which present much design detail, but there is little time to determine whether or not the design 
will meet the system’s key performance parameters.  Such evidence of feasibility is generally desired, but 
is considered as an optional appendix and is often neglected. In an ICSM evidence-based review, the 
feasibility evidence is a first-class deliverable.  As such, its planning and preparation becomes subject to 
earned value management and is factored into progress payments and award fees.  Investments in 
feasibility evidence have been found to pay off significantly in development rework avoidance [Boehm-
Valerdi-Honour, 2008]. The link between evidence-based and risk/opportunity-based decisionmaking is 
that shortfalls in evidence are uncertainties or probabilities of loss or gain. If the Opportunity Exposure 
OE is high and the window of opportunity is closing rapidly, proceeding at least incrementally with a 
small amount of evidence can be the best decision.  Thus, we can see that Principle 4 brings all of the 
other principles together.  It involves concerns with the stakeholders’ value propositions in making 
decisions as in Principle 1; with proceeding incrementally as in Principle 2; and with synchronizing and 
stabilizing the concurrent activity prescribed in Principle 3. 
3. Case Studies 
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3.1. Failure Stories  
Principle 1: The Too-Good Road Surface Assessment Robot. The Carnegie Mellon University Road 
Surface Assessment Robot project seemed to have done everything right.  It delivered a system with 
radically higher accuracy, efficiency, and labor savings with respect to its manual predecessor system.  
However, its end product still sits in a storage room unused [Latimer, 2008].  The project was executed 
over three years.  The first year explored alternative operational concepts for operating a robotic vehicle 
that would identify and mark deviations from roughness standards on the roadway.  The business case for 
the winning design indicated a likely 100:1 time and cost savings for inspection. The first year ended with 
a specification for the system’s functional and performance requirements that had been validated. The 
second year involved selection of outsourced components and detailed build-to specifications for the 
robot vehicle. The robot vehicle was successfully developed in the third year, and passed an acceptance 
test that had representative deviations built into it.  It also passed the test of reducing inspection time by a 
factor of 100. The system operated entirely according to the specifications, but not according to 
expectations.  A post-analysis by the lead engineer for surface assessment determined that all of the 
deviations were correctly reported by the system, but over 99% of them were minor, not ride-quality 
threatening. The roadway-contractor customer for the robot felt that its quality reputation would be 
unfairly degraded if all of these nonthreatening deviations were made part of the public record. As a 
result, the best-acceptable management solution was to discontinue the robot project and to continue to 
use manual surface assessment methods.  The lesson learned is the operational concept analyses were 
good, but the operational scenarios were focused only on the technical performance of the robot vehicle, 
and not on the effect of off-nominal outcomes or sociotechnical aspects on the stakeholders involved.   
Principle 3: Sequential RPV Systems Engineering and Development. The increasing cost-
effectiveness of remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) has led to a shortage of qualified RPV controllers, and 
a strong desire to improve the ratio of vehicles per controller from the current 1:2 ratio (one vehicle 
requiring two controllers for piloting and mission execution) to ideally a 4:1 ratio. A recent demonstration 
of agent technology showed a 4:1 capability for limited situations. A sequential approach that is 
representative of several recent government acquisition programs would use the demo results to create the 
requirements for a proposed program that used the agent-based technology to develop a 4:1 ratio system 
for operations.  A number of assumptions would be made to sell the program at an optimistic cost of $1 
billion and schedule of 40 months. These requirements would be included in a Request for Proposals 
(RFP). In the usual resulting competition, the winning bidder would provide an impressive demo of agent 
technology and a proposal indicating that all of the problems were well understood, that a preliminary 
design review (PDR) could be held in 120 days, and that the system could be delivered for $800M. 
However, at the PDR, the contractor could not show feasible solutions for several critical and commonly-
occurring scenarios. Since the schedule was tight and the contractor had almost run out of systems 
engineering funds, their management proposed to address the problems by using a “concurrent 
engineering” approach of having the programmers develop the off-nominal capabilities while the systems 
engineers were completing the detailed design.  Having no other face-saving alternative to declaring the 
PDR to be failed, the customers declared the PDR to be passed. Actually, this is a pernicious misuse of 
“concurrent engineering,” since there is not time to produce feasibility evidence and to synchronize and 
stabilize the numerous off-nominal approaches taken by the programmers and the detailed designers. 
Eventually, a 1:1 capability was achieved and the system delivered, but with reduced functionality, a cost 
of $3 billion, a schedule of 80 months and numerous interoperability problems.  Even worse, the hasty 
patching to get the first article delivered left the customer with a brittle, poorly documented, poorly-tested 
system that would be the source of many expensive years of system ownership and sub-par performance. 
3.2. Success Stories  
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Principle 2: The TRW Software Productivity Project (SPP).  In the 1970's, TRW was a leading 
company in developing fully-funded, total-commitment software systems for the U.S. Government. But 
in 1980-81, when TRW was using its own corporate funds to develop a system to significantly improve 
its software productivity, its management preferred to execute the project as a series of risk-driven 
incremental commitments. The first increment took 2 months and 12 person-months to perform 
interviews, surveys, and analyses that provided evidence that several technical and management 
opportunities to significantly improve productivity were available. The second increment took 6 months 
and 12 person-months to evaluate and synthesize several options for improving productivity at investment 
levels of $2K, $10 K, and $50K per performer. The $10K option was selected, and led to a commitment 
to fund a 15-person SPS development team working for a year with a committed large software 
development user project. The resulting SPS included dedicated private offices with interactive 
workstations connected by a local area network, along with associated management initiatives. The 
resulting capabilities were used by over 25 projects. Each project realized a productivity improvement of 
over 50%, with an average above a factor of 2. Further details are in [1] and [9]. 
Principle 4: CCPDS-R. The Command Center Processing and Display System Replacement (CCPDS-
R), was a project to re-engineer the command center aspects of the US early missile warning system.  It 
covered not only the software but also the associated system engineering and computing hardware 
procurement.  The software effort involved over 1 million lines of Ada code, across a family of three 
related user capabilities.  The core capability was developed on a 48-month fixed price contract between 
1987 and 1991.  One of the high risk elements is the extremely high dependability requirements for a 
system of this nature.  Others were the ability to re-engineer the sensor interfaces, the commander 
situation assessment and decision-aid displays, and the critical algorithms in the application.  The usual 
DoD-STD-2167A Preliminary Design Review (PDR) to review paper documents and briefing charts 
around Month 6 was replaced by a PDR at Month 14 that demonstrated working software for all the high-
risk areas, particularly the network operating system, the message-passing middleware and the graphic 
user interface (GUI) software.  The PDR also reviewed the completeness, consistency, and traceability of 
all of the Ada package interface specifications, as verified by the Rational Ada compiler and R-1000 
toolset.  Thus, a great deal of system integration was done before the software was developed. Evidence 
of achievable software productivity was provided via a well-calibrated cost and schedule estimation 
model, in this case an Ada version of the Constructive Cost Model (Ada COCOMO). Since the CCPDS-R 
plans and specifications were machine processable, the project was able to track progress and change at a 
very detailed level.  This enabled the developers to anticipate potential downstream problems and largely 
handle them via customer collaboration and early fixes. USAF/ESC and TRW agreed that the contract 
award fee for good performance would not just go into the TRW corporate profit coffers, but also for 
individual project performer bonuses.  This not only enhanced motivation and teamwork, but made the 
CCPDS-R project personnel turnover the lowest in TRW large-project history. The full capabilities plus 
changes were delivered within budget and schedule, with a remarkably flat cost-of-change vs. time curve 
[8]. 
4. Comparison to other principles 
A comparison of the four key ICSM principles with characteristics of the Lean principles [6] and 
principles for successful systems and systems engineering by Hitchins [5] was conducted and a summary 
of the results are shown in Table 1. Although there are differences in the level of detail in the way each 
set of principles is specified, there are no substantial differences with respect to guidance for a successful 
system. All focus on team working, efficiently performing value-adding activities at the appropriate point 
in the development life cycle, and eliminating activities that don’t add value. 
  
302  Barry Boehm et al. / Procedia Computer Science 8 (2012) 297 – 302
Barry Boehm, Supannika Koolmanojwong, Jo Ann Lane, and Richard Turner / ProcediaComputer Science 00 (2012) 000–000 
Table 1.  Key Principles Comparison 
ICSM Principles Lean Principles [6] Principles for successful systems and systems engineering 
[5] 
1. Stakeholder value-based 
system definition and 
evolution 
- See the whole 
- Empower the team 
- Holism “Consider whole when making decisions 
- Systems Approach “Consider System of Interest in 
context” 
- Progressive Satisfying “system success equals 
stakeholder success” 
2. Incremental commitment and 
accountability 
- Amplify learning 
- Decide as late as possible 
- Organism Analogy “Consider systems to have dynamic 
behavior” 
- Adaptive Optimizing “Solve problems progressively 
over time” 
- Progressive Entropy Reduction “Continue to make 
systems work over time” 
3. Concurrent multidiscipline 
system definition and 
development 
- Deliver as fast as possible 
- Empower the team 
- Synthesis “Bring parts together to create solutions” 
- Adaptive Optimizing “Solve problems progressively 
over time” 
4. Evidence and risk-driven 
decisionmaking 
- Build integrity in 
- Eliminate waste 
- Holism “Consider whole when making decisions 
- Progressive Entropy Reduction “Continue to make 
systems work over time” 
 
5. Conclusions 
If things aren’t changing much in your domain, and you already have a way to create successful 
systems, you should keep on using it.  But you will be in a shrinking minority as the 21st century pace of 
change increases. Wherever we look, things are rapidly changing: technology, competition, the nature of 
systems’ users, and in the infrastructure used to create systems. The four key ICSM principles of the 
Incremental Commitment Spiral Model (ICSM) enable you to adapt to the changes and perform to 
successful systems engineering and development. Case studies show that the projects yield satisfactory 
results when they have a successful usage of the four principles, on the other hand, the failure case studies 
failed to apply one or more of the principles.  
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